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Washington, D.C. 20530

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January 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS

AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT:

Current Status of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and its Future Role

The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) was established by directive of the National Security Council on March 22, 1949 (NSC 17/4). instituted to absorb and consolidate the functions of existing internal security committees, and to effect the coordination of all phases of the internal security field except those of an investigative nature, which were assigned to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC). The ICIS functioned under the Council's direction until the issuance of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 161, dated June 9, 1962, which transferred the ICIS and the IIC to the supervision of the Attorney General and assigned to him primary responsibility for ensuring the development of plans, programs and action proposals to protect the internal security of the United States. On March 5, 1964, a revised Charter was issued by the Attorney General to reflect the provisions of NSAM 161.

Although the ICIS continues to oversee and coordinate a significant number of important internal security programs, it obviously is not being utilized to its full potential nor entirely for the purposes for which it was established. We believe it necessary, therefore, to completely reassess the role of the Committee and its relationship to the national internal security.

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DOJ Review

in Justice

In this connection, the ICIS determined in 1975 that a review of its charter and responsibilities would be conducted, which would include the identification and divestiture of those areas where the Committee had been pre-empted, and the institution of new initiatives in areas where there appeared to be voids. To aid in the review, the ICIS Secretariat was directed to compile a listing of the problems the Committee had considered in the past, and distribute it to the concerned departments and agencies through the members of the ICIS and its several subordinate groups. The listing was distributed by memorandum from the Executive Secretary, dated December 16, 1975, and subject as above.

Inasmuch as the memorandum directed to working level officials evoked negligible response, we are re-instituting the review at the agency-head level. Accordingly, there is attached hereto a listing of 77 generic problems (and their sub-problems, where appropriate), numbered as they appear in the ICIS filing system. For purposes of clarity, the listing has been divided into three categories: (1) ACTIVE PROBLEMS, which the Subcommittees review periodically, and otherwise consider on an ad hoc basis; (2) DIS-CONTINUED PROBLEMS, which have been dropped from further consideration as a result of past Subcommittee reviews; PROBLEMS DROPPED OR REFERRED AFTER INITIAL CON-SIDERATION, listed primarily for background information. Also attached is a copy of the ICIS Charter, and two problem areas in which the Committee might reassert its responsibilities. It is requested that each department and agency review the attachments with a view toward submitting suggestions or comments concerning the following:

- Any new problems which should be considered by the Committee;
- (2) Any problems of which the Committee should divest itself (Should include a statement as to whether any other groups are known to be working in the area);

- (3) Any problems in which the Committee should expand its activities, or become re-involved (All departments and agencies are specifically requested to comment on the suggested review of emergency internal security plans and preparations appearing as Item I in the attached "Proposed New or Expanded Problem Areas");
- (4) Any recommendation for amendments to the ICIS Charter; and
- (5) Any other related observations concerning the Committee's structure, procedure, current status or future role.

We believe this review to be an important part of the overall assessment of the current status of the ICIS and its future relationship to the nation's internal security. Therefore, we would appreciate a response from each department and agency, and request that it be furnished no later than March 4, 1977. Any questions concerning this matter should be directed to myself (telephone 739-2333), or Mr. William B. Wark, ICIS Executive Secretary (telephone 739-2316).

Robert L. Keuch
Acting Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee

on Internal Security

Attachments

ACTIVE ICIS PROBLEMS

- 1. To prevent the entry through the visa medium and at the frontiers of persons who are actually or potentially dangerous to the security of the United States
 - C. Security Measures Applicable
 to Nationals of Communistcontrolled Countries Entering
 the U.S. as Nonimmigrant Aliens
 - E. Security Screening Procedures
 for Escapees and Refugees Seeking Admission to the U.S. from
 Communist Areas (NSC 5607/2)
 (Incorporates ICIS generic Prob. 60)
 - H. Security Safeguards Applicable
 to Visits to U.S. Ports by
 Public Vessels of Communistcontrolled Countries

Entry Into the U.S. of Crewmen from Communist-controlled Countries Aboard Any Merchant or Private Vessel

- J. Fraudulent Use or Forgery of U.S. Travel Documents
- 2. To control the exit of persons whose exit is or may be detrimental to the security of the United States
 - A. To Decrease Security Risks in the Issuance of Passports and Other Documentation

(Previously ICIS generic Prob. 6)

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Lefing means to Control Travel

Abroad of U.S. Citizens Who Might

Divulge Vital Information Through

Cultural Exchange - (Students,

Educators, and Others)

(Previously ICIS generic Prob. 34)

- 3. To prevent the illegal entry of persons in order to exclude those who are actual or potential dangers to the United States
 - A. <u>Illegal Entries into the U.S. -</u>
 Birth Registration
- 4. To effect the deportation or detention of undesirable aliens whose countries of origin refuse to receive them
 - A. To Control Where Possible Undesirable Aliens Whose Countries of Origin Refuse to Receive Them (Previously ICIS generic Prob. 62)
- 7. To neutralize so far as possible espionage and subversive activities of the personnel of foreign diplomatic, consular or other missions, including international organizations
 - A. Persona Non Grata Procedures

Travel Restrictions on Soviet Employees of the U.N.

To Restrict Contacts by Soviet
Bloc Officials With Emigres
from Soviet Bloc Countries

9. To increase the number and comprehensiveness of searches of persons, baggage, parcel post, and freight entering or leaving the United States

- A. <u>Disposition</u> of MAP Trainees
- 18. To protect in a practical uncomplicated manner all classified information related particularly to data of a military nature available to industrial organizations throughout the country
 - C. Employment of Immigrant Aliens in Classified Government Projects
- 20. To control visits to industrial facilities where internal security may be adversely affected
 - A. <u>Industrial Inspection</u> by Foreign Nationals
- 21. To effectuate a program delegating specific responsibility for the security and physical protection of vital industrial, transportation and utility installations and facilities
 - A. <u>Physical Security of</u>
 Defense Key Facilities

Protection Against Sabotage,
Espionage, and Subversion of
Industrial Facilities Important
to War Mobilization or the
Essential Civilian Economy

Physical Security of Governmental and Industrial Facilities Important to the National Defense

Approved For Release 2007/08/07: CIA-RDP80M00165A001900130006-5 Security Definitions and the Delimitation Agreement

- 22. To effectuate a system for the physical security and protection of government buildings, records and personnel
- 25. To study the problems attendant upon protection from unconventional attack
 - F. <u>Denial or Revocation of</u>
 <u>Airmen Certificates</u>

(Incorporates ICIS generic Probs. 29 and 70)

Defense Against the Employment of Civil Aircraft in Unconventional Attack

(Incorporates ICIS generic Prob. 28)

- G. Special Defensive Measures
 to be Instituted by the
 Bureau of Customs in the
 Event of an Emergency
- I. <u>Defense Against the Assassina-</u> tion or Kidnapping of Certain Government Officials
- J. Systems for Reporting Gutbreaks of Human. Animal, and Plant Diseases in the U.S.

Defense Against Biological Warfare in the U.S.

Vulnerability of Vital Targets to Covert CBR Attack

Soviet Research Applicable to Development of CW Incapacitating Agents

P-I-A. Reappraisal of U.S. Defenses
Against Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons

Internal Nuclear Threat

- P-II-C. Customs Survey Program
- P-II-G. Internal Security Safeguards
 Applicable to the Entry into
 the U.S. of Special Diplomatic
 Flights of Aircraft of Communistcontrolled Countries

Internal Security Safequards
Applicable to the Entry into the
U.S. of Aircraft of Communistcontrolled Countries Engaged in
Scheduled and Non-scheduled Air
Services to the U.S.

Emergency Landings of Aircraft of Communist-controlled Countries in U.S. Territory

- P-V-A. Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Across Seacoasts (PADIE)
- 38. To protect the security of United States patents
- 39. To determine and control the material and information American contractors are sending to foreign interests
- 42. Protection of transportation facilities
 - A. <u>Vulnerability of Key Trans-</u> portation Systems and <u>Facilities</u> to Sabotage

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 operation of private amateur and
 commercial radio facilities
 - A. Telecommunications Security

Radio Security - Diplomatic Radio Stations

Radio Operators Security Program

- 48. To prepare for immediate application, for use when deemed necessary, a planned port security program for the protection of wharves, docks and piers, and strategic cargo stored thereon
- 51. To control the procurement, possession and use of firearms and explosives by persons who are actually or potentially dangerous to the United States
- 63. To consider the question of the dissemination of strategic information in the course of insurance practices
 - A. Safequarding Vital Information Through Insurance Practices
- 64. To consider the question of the dissemination of unclassified non-statistical government information
 - B. Availability of U.S. Scientific and Technical Data to the Soviet Union, China, and Other Communist Countries

- To determine the status and disposition to be made, in the event of a war-related emergency, of the crew members and officers of alien enemy vessels in American ports
 - A. To Determine the Status and
 Disposition to be Made in the
 Event of a War-related Emergency
 of Vessels and Aircraft and Persons
 Thereon Seized During an Emergency
- 69. Security processing and screening mechanism for persons evacuated from danger areas
- 73. To consider the adequacy of the controls over the export of strategic materials
- 75. NATO Status of Forces Agreement

DISCONTINUED PROBLEMS

- 5. To establish a centralized system of immigration records pertaining to all aliens
- 8. To prepare policies and procedures for the handling of diplomatic and other official personnel attached to foreign embassies, consulates, special missions and international organizations in the event of a break in relations or a state of war between the U.S. and any other foreign country
- 10. To establish more effective controls and surveillance over vessels and aircraft of foreign registry (particularly Soviet and satellites) and alien crews
- 14. To strengthen legislation of the Espionage Act of 1917 with respect to internal security
- 17. To protect in a practical uncomplicated manner all classified government data

Dropped upon issuance of E.O. 11652 of Harch 8, 1972, which established the Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC)

19. To establish uniform specifications and procedures for all departments of the National Military Establishment (NME) for industrial personnel clearance and contract categorizations; also to provide an agency for maintaining central records of factories cleared for work on classified contracts by the Papartments of Army, Navy and Air Force

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 To prepare for immediate application
 in the event of war a civilian
 censorship plan
- 27. To coordinate the preparation of emergency legislation and legislative acts and executive orders presently prepared and on file in other departments concerned with internal security
- 33. To establish effective controls
 over United States technical personnel working in foreign countries
 to prevent undesirable disclosure of
 technological knowledge
- 41. To prevent infiltration of undesirable financial interests in United States industry
- 55. To protect classified government data during the course of litigation, investigations and public hearings
- 56. To consider the problem of restricting the dissemination by non-government agencies of unclassified technological information on a voluntary basis
- 57. To determine the necessity for uniform security clearance procedures for personnel in the executive branch of the government
- 61. To provide a more effective basis for internal security planning (Net Evaluations)

- Government Employee Security
 Program E.O. 10450
- 71. To consider the matter of requiring security checks in connection with government classified contracts, government contracts whose end result would be highly classified, and government contracts which require access to other classified information
- 72. The importation of Communist literature
- 74. Congressional publication of information of advantage to foreign governments
- 76. Personnel security of U.S. citizens employed or to be employed by U.S. or other public international organizations
- 77. Security policy and planning regarding treatment to be accorded aliens in the event of a national emergency

AFTER INITIAL CONSIDERATION

11. To apprehend and detain in the event of an emergency United States citizens of non-military status who constitute a threat to the nation's internal security.

Assumed by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC). Repealed by P.L. 92-128 - 9/25/7I.

12. To control subversive individuals in the military forces of the United States

Assumed by the IIC.

- 15. To obtain the clearance and presentation to Congress by the Executive Branch of the Bill "Relating to the Internal Security of the United States" proposed by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and sponsored by the Department of Justice
- 16. To prepare an Alien Enemy Control Program which will provide for the registration, arrest, detention, of alien enemies determined to constitute a dancer to the nation's internal security

Assumed by the IIC.

23. To prepare for instant implementation adequate censorship measures for the NME

Assumed by the IIC.

26. To improve foreign political, economic and military intelligence

Assumed by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

- 30. To determine a generally accepted and specific definition of the scope of civilian defense
- 31. To coordinate civilian defense plans and activities with other internal security measures
- 32. To consider the need for and means of effecting registration of all United States citizens for security purposes and for possible allocation according to skills and the needs of industry

Referred to National Security Resources Board (NSRB).

- 35. To protect public morale and educate the public concerning internal security matters
- 36. To prepare plans for dispersion of government agencies

Referred to NSRB.

37. To insure the continuing lavalty and personnel security of government employees

Assumed by the IIC.

40. To encourage the construction,
dispersion and camouflage of industry in such a manner as to contribute to internal security

Referred to NSRB.

43. To determine the relation of measures of economic warfare defense to internal security

Referred to NSRB.

- 44. To determine the relation of financial security measures to internal security
- 45. To determine the relation of agricultural security measures to internal security
- 46. To coordinate the internal security program with the plans for the military defense of the United States
- 49. To formulate a procedure for the establishment of control of foreign funds and securities held within the United States and its territories and possessions

Referred to MSRB.

50. To plan a program for immediate seizure and control of enemy alien property

Referred to NSRB.

- 52. What limitations are there on action ICIS can take with respect to proposed or pending legislation involving internal security matters
- To establish general categories of internal security problems and to assign each category to the appropriate ICIS member as a primary responsibility for initiating action in respect thereto
- 54. To procure enactment of the Internal
 Security bill introduced into the
 Eighty-first Congress with special
 reference to H.R. 3563, a bill authorizing acquisition and interception of
 communications in the interest of
 national security
- 58. To prevent the filing of spurious radio or wire messages alledgedly originated by any agency or department of the government
- 59. To protect the national security in matters involving the publication and use of statistical information
- 65. To evaluate and determine, from the standpoint of possible injury to the national economy, the relative importance of protecting those lights of interest or activity, apart from industry, from damage by any form of enemy attack

Referred to Industry Evaluation Board.

56. To consider restrictions on exportation of publications (non-technical) to China and other areas

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March 5, 1964

CHARTER

Pursuant to the provisions of National Security Action Memorandum 161, dated June 9, 1962 from the President, the Attorney General hereby authorizes and directs that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) effect the coordination of all phases of the internal security field except as pertains to the following functions which are assigned to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC): the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage; counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. The ICIS shall be guided by the terms of this Charter.

A. ORGANIZATION

- (1) The ICIS shall be composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice.
- (2) The Chairman shall be designated by the President from the membership of the Committee after consultation with the Attorney General. An executive secretary shall also be selected by the ICIS, and he shall be responsible for maintaining the necessary records. An adequate secretariat staff composed of representatives of all member departments shall be provided.*
- (3) The ICIS, through its Chairman, shall invite nonmember agency representatives as ad hoc members of the ICIS when matters involving the responsibilities of such nonmembers are

^{*} Pursuant to OMB Circular A-63, issued March 2, 1964, the secretariat staff is provided entirely by the Department of Justice as the chairing agency.

under consideration.

B. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- (1) The ICIS, in its field, or in collaboration with the IIC, shall take the necessary action to insure the establishment and maintenance of the highest practicable state of internal security, including the making of necessary plans and preparations for adequate internal security in the event of a war-related emergency.
- (2) The ICIS shall make appropriate studies and take necessary action to insure that complete coverage is maintained by all appropriate departments and agencies in those matters under its jurisdiction.
- (3) The ICIS shall take the necessary action to insure that there is no duplication of effort by governmental departments and agencies in those matters under its jurisdiction.
- (4) The ICIS shall take the necessary steps to procure resolution of any conflicts of jurisdiction that may arise in the field of internal security for which the ICIS is responsible, and it shall determine by what agency or department necessary action will be handled.
- (5) The ICIS shall study and make recommendations with reference to legislation, executive orders, and regulations needed to achieve the objectives of the ICIS.
- (6) The ICIS shall promote appropriate exchange and coordination of information, as well as action, among the several agencies and departments of the government.
- (7) The ICIS shall incorporate under it, or absorb the functions of, existing interdepartmental committees which may be operating in its field of responsibility.
- (8) The ICIS shall establish guidance in all matters under its jurisdiction and shall perform such other functions in its field as may be necessary or as may be assigned to it by the Attorney General.

C. PROCEDURE

- (1) The ICIS shall establish such ad hoc and working committees as may be necessary for the purpose of discharging its responsibilities.
- (2) The ICIS shall initiate and coordinate necessary studies, projects, and surveys relating to its responsibilities. It shall request, receive, and correlate suggestions or actual studies, projects, and surveys from nonmember agencies in the field of responsibility assigned to the ICIS.
- (3) The ICIS shall maintain coordination with the IIC through the Chairman of the ICIS. Whenever appropriate, the ICIS will hold joint meetings or establish joint subcommittees with the IIC.
- (4) The ICIS shall submit to the Attorney General those problems which require consideration or action by the Attorney General and those problems which cannot be resolved and worked out through cooperative consideration and action.

PROPOSED NEW OR EXPANDED

PROBLEM AREAS

I. Review of Emergency Internal
Security Plans Maintained
Throughout Government

Although various aspects of internal security contingency planning have been examined in recent years through periodic reviews by the ICIS Subcommittees, there has not been an overall, comprehensive review of plans and preparations maintained throughout Government. This, therefore, may be an area in which the Committee should reassert its responsibilities and expand its activities.

II. Recommendations With Reference to New Legislation, Executive Orders, and Regulations Needed to Achieve the Objectives of the ICIS

This may be an area in which the Committee should institute new initiatives pursuant to Section (B)(5) of its Charter. Departments and agencies are urged to submit for consideration any recommendations they may have concerning new or amended legislation, or executive orders, deemed necessary to correct apparent deficiencies in the national internal security.

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